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We study the short-run and long-run performance of Chinese privatization initial public offerings 
(PIPOs), using data for 340 and 409 new issues on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
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China has been undertaking a series of economic reforms during the past two decades, 
gradually moving from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy. The 
formation of the two stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 was one of the 
key developments. Besides allowing enterprises to raise funds by issuing corporate 
bonds and stocks to the public, one of the main tasks for the government is to seek 
efficiency and productivity transformation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through 
economic and shareholding reforms. The privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
China provides an interesting case study of initial public offerings (IPOs) because of 
its importance in the transition from socialism to a modern market economy. In 
addition, in November 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Opening up its securities markets has been put into the government’s schedule, so an 
understanding of the performance and the characteristics of the Chinese IPO markets 
becomes the focus of attention for investors at home and abroad.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that there are two main patterns associated with IPOs: the 
short-run underpricing of IPOs and their poor stock price performance in the long run. 
The study of Loughran et al. (1994) found that the IPO underpricing phenomenon 
existed in 25 countries, with higher IPO underpricing in developing markets than that 
in developed markets. The extent of IPO underpricing ranged from a few percent 
(Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989) for 38 US investment bank issues to an 
astounding 149.3% in the developing Malaysian market (see the summary table by 
Hanley and Ritter, 1992). Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) and Loughran et al. (1994) 
examined the returns on IPOs during the three years after going public for a number 
of countries. They equally-weighted the IPOs in their respective samples and all 
found poor performance.  
 
In terms of Privatization Initial Public Offerings (PIPOs), for a 7-country sample 
(Canada, France, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and the UK) Dewenter and ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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Malatesta (1997) found no general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced more 
than private sector IPOs. In contrast, Paudyal et al. (1998) found that Malaysian 
PIPOs offered significantly higher initial returns (103.5%) than other IPOs (52.5%). 
However, researchers find very different pictures for the long-run performance of 
PIPOs. Menyah et al. (1995) examined the British experience and documented 
significantly positive long-run abnormal returns for Share Issue Privatization (SIP) 
investors. Choi et al. (2000) compared long-run buy-and-hold returns of PIPOs 
offerings to those of domestic stock markets of respective countries using a sample of 
204 PIPOs from 37 countries. Their evidence indicated that the privatization IPOs 
significantly outperformed their domestic stock markets. 
 
Turning to the study of the Chinese IPO market, Datar and Mao (1998) studied 226 
sample firms that went public in 1990-96 and found underpricing of 388%. Liu and Li 
(2000) studied 781 stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 
1991 to 1999 and found the average market-adjusted return of 139.4%. However, 
there is little research on long-run performance due to data shortages. Gu (2000) 
studied the long-term, up to five-year returns on the 68 companies that went public in 
1994 and were traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and found that the returns 
were generally negative. However, the long-run returns in his research did not 
incorporate dividend payments and were not adjusted for rights and scrip issues, 
which therefore, would not present a clear picture of the long-run performance of the 
Chinese IPOs.  
 
In this paper, we first discuss the features of China’s emerging stock markets and 
certain unique ‘Chinese Characteristics’ that may affect IPO performance. Second, we 
estimate the extent of underpricing and the long-run returns of 340 and 409 A-share 
IPOs that went public on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges respectively, 
from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 1997. We find that the average market-adjusted 
initial returns on the first trading day is 127.31%, and the initial returns on the two 
stock exchanges are not significantly different from each other. The average market-ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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adjusted buy and hold returns over the three years after listing is 10.26%, which is 
significantly positive at the 1% level. This result is similar to other research (Jelic and 
Briston, 2000) on the PIPO’s long-run performance. Thirdly, using a regression 
approach, we identify that government ownership, offering size and the feature of 
belonging to the “high-tech” industry are the key reasons for the long-run 
outperformance of IPOs in China. In addition, firms that perform better in the long-
run tend to make more Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), and the underpricing of 
IPOs is negatively related to their long-run performance. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the features of 
China’s stock markets and IPOs; Section 3 presents the data, the methodology for 
calculating the short-run and long-run returns and the results; Section 4 explains the 
long-run outperformance by some managerial factors; The results for the cross 
sectional analysis are reported in Section 5; Summary and conclusions appear in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Features of the Chinese Stock Market and IPOs 
 
The following characteristics of the offering and listing processes during the study 
period distinguish the Chinese IPO markets from those in other countries. (Chi and 
Padgett, 2001) 
• The China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) determines an annual 
quota
1 for new shares to be issued each year. The quota is allocated among the 
provinces and state-industrial commissions according to criteria that support 
regional or industrial development goals, in consideration of the balance 
among provinces and industries (Su and Fleisher, 1999). In theory, business 
strength is the criterion for enterprises to be chosen. Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs
2) also need the permission of the CSRC. 
                                                         
1 This quota system started to change in 2001. Investment banks can recommend companies to the 
CSRC for listing, but it is still the CSRC which makes the final decision. 
2 All the SEOs we mention in the paper refer to SEOs to the existing shareholders. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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• After a firm is permitted to go public, shares not retained by the government, 
other enterprises or employees are sold to outside investors through IPOs and 
SEOs. In China, stocks are classified by ownership into eight categories: Non-
negotiable stocks: State-owned Stocks, Founder Stocks (Local), Founder 
Stocks (Foreign), Legal-Entity Stocks, Employee Stocks
3; Negotiable stocks: 
A Shares, B shares, and H shares (shares of Chinese companies traded in 
Hong Kong stock exchange) (Mok and Hui, 1998). According to the CSRC 
statistics, at the end of 2000, negotiable (tradable) shares comprised around 
35.7% of the total shares. 
• In China, there are two stock exchanges—the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Shanghai is the financial centre in China. 
Shenzhen is a city in the southern China and next to Hong Kong. Although it 
does not have the same financial traditions as Shanghai, it was the first city to 
carry out economic reforms from the beginning of the 1980s.  
• The two types of stocks tradable on the two exchanges in China are ‘A’ shares 
and ‘B’ shares. The ‘A’ shares, traded in domestic currency (Yuan), are 
exclusively for domestic Chinese. The B shares, traded in US dollars on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and in Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, are exclusively for foreign investors and allocated primarily by 
private placements
4. The A- and B-share markets are segmented.  
• The offering price is chosen by the CSRC a few days sometimes months 
before market trading starts, and in most cases there is no feedback 
mechanism working through market demand that allows adjustment in the 
offer price (Su and Fleisher, 1999). The CSRC also takes charge of the timing 
of IPOs due to the market situation and capacity. 
• The offering mechanism adopted by most Chinese firms is different from that 
in mature stock markets. As a result of the serious imbalance of supply and 
                                                         
3 Companies that went public before November 1998 can issue 10% share out of the total public 
offerings to their employees. The employee stocks could be traded 6 months after listing in the stock 
exchange. Since the underpricing of Chinese IPOs is very severe, the employee stocks were treated as a 
form of bonus to employees. 
4 From February 2001 domestic Chinese could invest in B shares in foreign currencies.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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demand, the A-shares are distributed through a lottery system, in which there 
is a fixed price offer with investors bidding for quantities. The odds of 
winning the lottery depend on how much money joins the lottery. Winners are 
selected via a random number generating scheme and are entitled to purchase 
shares (usually one thousand shares) at the issue price (Gu, 2000). As the 
demand for the new shares far exceeds the supply, only a small percentage of 
the subscriptions win the lottery. 
• It is also noteworthy that SEOs are very frequently observed among Chinese 
issuers and that SEOs account for a substantial portion of shares issued. About 
91% of the Chinese firms that went public before 1 July 1994 issued seasoned 
equities before 1 January 1996 (Su and Fleisher, 1999), because IPOs and 
SEOs are the most cost-efficient way for Chinese enterprises to raise capital.  
 
3. Data, Methodology and Results on the Short-run and Long-run Performance 
 
There are 409 companies that issued and listed their A-shares in either the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1 January 1996 to 31 
December 1997. To be able to compare the aftermarket performance within the first 
three years after the first trading day for the sample firms, only issues with a first 
trading day earlier than 31 December 1997 are used. Initial trading prices (the closing 
price on the first trading day), and monthly closing prices over three years after listing 
were obtained from the GTA
5 China’s Trading Database. Information concerning the 
particulars of offerings, including the offering price, the government ownership, the 
offering size, the average earnings per share over three years before the firm’s listing, 
whether the listed company was “high-tech” etc., was obtained from the GTA China’s 
IPO Database. In the study of long-run returns, the sample consists of all 409 listed 
companies, while in the study of initial returns, the sample size is reduced to 340 due 
to missing data on the issuance. 
 
                                                         
5 The database is offered by Shenzhen GTA (Guo Tai An) Information Technology Co., Ltd. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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Table 1 gives the IPOs on the Chinese markets by the year of issue from January 1996 
to December 1997. The numbers of issues in both years were very close, with 203 in 
1996 and 206 in 1997. The issues were equally divided between the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1996, while in 1997, 121 companies 
were listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and only 85 on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. Figure 1 shows the number of companies coming to the official list during 
the sample period.  
 
To facilitate direct comparisons with existing empirical evidence, the measures of 
performance for each IPO and for groups of IPOs are calculated using the 
methodology used by Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993).  
 
The total return for stock ‘i’ at the end of the first trading day is calculated as: 
1 ) / ( 0 1 1 - = i i i P P R                                                                                                          (1) 
where  1 i P  is the price of the stock ‘i’ at the close of the first trading day, and  0 i P  is the 
offer price and  1 i R  is the total first-day return on the stock. 
 
The return on the market index during the same time period is: 
1 ) / ( 0 1 1 - = m m m P P R                                                                                                       (2) 
where  1 m P  is the market index value at the close of first trading day and  0 m P  is the 
market index value on the offer day of the appropriate stock, while  1 m R  is the first 
day’s comparable market return.  
 
Using these two returns, the market-adjusted abnormal return for each IPO on the first 
day of trading is computed as: 
( ) ( ) [ ] { } 1 1 / 1 100 1 1 1 - + + · = m i i R R MAAR                                                                      (3) 
When  1 i MAAR  is interpreted as an abnormal return, it is assumed that the systematic 
risk of the IPOs under consideration is the same as that of the index, i.e., the betas of 
the IPOs average to unity. A number of studies, both in the US (Ibbotson, 1975 and 
Affleck et al., 1991) and in the UK (Sudarsanam, 1992), have demonstrated that the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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average beta of newly listed firms is higher than one. Thus, the abnormal return 
1 i MAAR  calculated in (3) provides a somewhat upwardly-biased estimate of the initial 
performance of the IPO relative to the market. 
 
The sample mean abnormal return for the first trading day,  1 MAAR , may be viewed 
as a performance index which reflects the return, in excess of the market return, on a 






i MAAR N MAAR
1
1 1 / 1                                                                                             (4) 
 
To test the hypothesis that  1 MAAR  equals zero, we compute the associated t statistic: 
[ ] [ ] N S MAAR t / / 1 =                                                                                                   (5) 
where S  is the standard deviation of  1 i MAAR  across the companies.  
 
Following other studies of the Chinese securities markets, we use the Shanghai A-
share Index and the Shenzhen A-share Index as corresponding benchmarks. They are 
capitalization-weighted indices, using all A-shares listed on the stock exchange. 
 
Table 2 gives the average first day returns for the IPOs for the entire sample and for 
those on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange separately. Figure 2 shows the 
frequency of the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs for the whole sample. For the 
entire sample, the  1 MAAR  is found to be 127.31% with an associated t-statistic of 
31.21
6, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The  1 i MAAR  has a 
median of 118.34% and a standard deviation of 75.21. Although the average market-
adjusted initial return for IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (122.49%) is lower 
than that on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (131.40%) during the sample period, they 
are not significantly different from each other. The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange are both non-profitable membership organizations under 
the supervision of the CSRC. After getting permission to go public, issuers can 
                                                         
6 The t-statistics on the initial returns must be interpreted with caution since the distribution of initial 
returns is positively skewed. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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choose to be listed on either stock exchange, and therefore it is understandable that 
there is not much difference between the initial returns of IPOs in these two stock 
exchanges. 
 
Like other research (Mok and Hui, 1998, and Su and Fleisher, 1999), we find an 
abnormally high degree of underpricing of IPOs in China. As for the reasons, Chau et 
al. (1994) and Gu (2000) both mentioned that the lack of attractive investment 
opportunities caused the high demand for stocks and high initial returns of IPOs. 
Besides this, we think the most important point is the high demand that comes from 
the quota system. For the Chinese government, the stock market is an important 
channel to raise capital for SOEs. To keep the stock market growing and to raise more 
money in the future, the government has to control the ‘supply’, that is the quota of 
new issues. In privatization, the success of any IPO not only affects the individual 
company’s reputation, but also the government’s credibility, and hence the 
government cannot afford any possible failure in the IPO markets. That is why the 
government has to make the supply much less than the demand, even at the cost of 
underpricing.  
 
The market-adjusted long-run returns are calculated for a period of 36 months 
following the first month of trading. The monthly returns are measured by the closing 
prices on the last trading day of the month on which the stock is traded. These returns 
incorporate dividend payments and are adjusted for rights and scrip issues. Allowing 
for the initial underpricing and the possibility of price support in the first few trading 
days and the time these prices will take to adjust downwards to the true market 
equilibrium after the support has been withdrawn, the first month of trading is 
excluded from the study of long-run returns. The following methodology is used to 
calculate the long-run returns: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ￿
=
= - - - =
37
2 1 , , 1 , , / ln / ln
t
t t m t m t i t i i I I p p MABHR                                                          (6) 
where  i MABHR denotes the market-adjusted buy and hold return for firm ‘i’ over a 36 
month period and  t i P,  and  t m I ,  denote the end of the t month share price for the firm ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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‘i’ and the corresponding end of the month index respectively. These returns exclude 
initial under-pricing. 
 
This methodology is comparable to Ritter (1991).  While Ritter used wealth relatives 
to interpret the 3-year total return, we use equally weighted market adjusted returns as 
an abnormal performance measure. 
 
Buy and hold returns are preferred to Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). Conrad 
and Kaul (1993) showed that cumulative abnormal returns are biased because they not 
only process true returns but also the upward bias in single period returns induced by 
errors in measurement. In contrast buy and hold returns do not suffer from this bias. 
Moreover, CARs implicitly assume frequent and thus costly portfolio rebalancing. 
Brav et al. (1998) have asserted that buy and hold returns are the generic choice of a 
naïve investor. This is in contrast to informed investors who prefer monthly portfolio 
rebalancing. Since in China, over 90% investors are individuals, we take the point of 
view of an individual investor and hence choose buy and hold returns. As in the case 
of calculating short-run returns, we have not adjusted the monthly abnormal returns 
for systematic risk. Ibbotson (1975) and Ritter (1991) among others demonstrated that 
the average betas decline with the length of time after the IPO and the average 
difference in betas between the IPOs and matching firms becomes too small to have 
any significant effect on the results. 
 
A simple cross sectional t-test for the significance of the MABHR using Ritter (1991) 
was computed as follows: 
) / ( t t SD N MABHR test t · = -
7                                                                                 (7) 
where  t MABHR  is the cross sectional market-adjusted buy and hold returns for the 
sample at time t, N is the number of firms in the sample at time t and  t SD  is the cross 
                                                         
7 A number of studies including Ritter (1991), Aggarwal et al. (1993), and Levis (1993) have 
calculated the t statistics using this equation. Though we acknowledge that due to a loss of a degree of 
freedom, the number of firms in the sample should be reduced by one (so it should be N-1 and not N), 
the sample size is large enough to ignore the small difference in calculations that would arise. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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sectional standard deviation of the market-adjusted buy and hold returns at time t. 
 
The benchmarks used are the Shanghai A-share Index and Shenzhen A-share Index, 
the same as the ones in the study of the short-run performance. 
 
Table 3 gives the average monthly MABHR returns with the associated t-statistics for 
the 37 months after going public. Since in the Chinese securities markets there is no 
formal delisting system, the sample size has been the same throughout the sample 
period. The average market-adjusted buy and hold returns over three years after 
listing for the entire sample is found to be 10.26% with a t-statistic of 3.962. As with 
most PIPO’s long-run performance, the three-year excess buy and hold returns in the 
Chinese IPO markets are significantly positive. Among monthly average market-
adjusted returns, only 11 of 36 are found to be negative with 3 of them having t-
statistics lower than -2.0, while 25 are positive with 9 of them having t-statistics 
higher than 2.0. 
 
Figure 3 shows the plot of market-adjusted (A-share Index adjusted) monthly returns 
for the sample. The returns vary between -2.9% and 1.9% over the study period. The 
return peaks at 1.9% in the 6
th month of trading. A minimum return of -2.9% is 
recorded in the 2
nd month after listing. The returns in the 2
nd and 3
rd trading months 
are very low. This may be caused by the severe underpricing of IPOs, since it takes 
some time for the share prices to adjust downwards to the true market equilibrium. 
Apart from returns for these two months, returns until the 23
rd trading month are all 
positive, with the 6
th month enjoying the highest return. Companies that went public 
before November 1998 could issue 10% of shares from the total public offerings to 
their employees. The employees could buy shares at the offering price and the 
employee stocks could be traded starting from the 6
th month after listing in the stock 
exchange. Since employee shares are treated as a kind of bonus for employees, the 
share price around the 6
th trading month should determine the returns of their 
investment. To make employees happy and loyal to their own company, managers ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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often try to push the share price up around the 6
th trading month by working with 
institutional investors. As all sample firms were listed before November 1998, 
companies could possibly issue employee shares and therefore have this influence on 
the share price performance. In addition, in comparison with returns in the first two 
years after listing, returns in the third year of trading are much lower and most of 
them are negative. Figure 4 shows the monthly MABHR cumulative returns for the 
sample. 
 
Figure 5 gives the frequency of the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of 
the sample firms. 
 
4. Explaining the Long-run Performance 
 
The empirical evidence of the long-run performance of firms going public indicates 
that the PIPOs and private sector IPOs do not perform in quite the same way. Like 
other research (Menyah and Paudyal, 1996, Jelic and Briston, 2000, and Megginson et 
al., 2000), we find significantly positive three-year buy and hold market-adjusted 
returns for 409 PIPOs that went public in 1996 and 1997 in China.  
 
A non-negative long-run abnormal performance for PIPOs coincides with the 
objectives of a market-oriented government, since a committed government will be 
interested in building up a reputation for its privatization programme over time by 
establishing a market-oriented economic environment. To better understand the 
positive long-run returns of IPOs, we look at the relationship between the three-year 
buy and hold after-market returns and some managerial characteristics of listed 
companies to see what elements actually affect the long-run performance of IPOs in 
China. 
 
4.1 The Long-run Performance and Government Ownership 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) show in their model that the fraction of shares a ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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government sells at the initial offer is an important factor for the restructuring efforts 
of state enterprises. The higher is the fraction sold, the lower is the possibility that 
politicians interfere directly. They conclude that the relationship between restructuring 
activities and the fraction of the state enterprise sold at the initial offer should be 
positive. Provided that a lower state holding leads to a better restructuring, the long-
run abnormal performance should be negatively associated with the fraction owned by 
the government. In a study of the Chinese IPO markets, Mok and Hui (1998) 
mentioned that there could be two different effects of the proportion of shares owned 
by the government on the short-run performance of IPOs. On the one hand, since 
shares owned by the government may act as a guarantee of the performance of the 
company by the state, the more shares owned by the state, the higher the initial returns 
would be, due to the public’s greater confidence in the company. On the other hand, 
the more shares offered to the public, that is to say, the fewer shares owned by the 
state, the better initial returns would be, because of the possible improvement of 
management in the future. As for its effect on the long-run performance, it is believed 
that with more shares in public hands, outside investors will monitor and put pressure 
on the management of SOEs, which would improve the corporate governance of the 
companies. This is one of the goals of privatization. We would expect if the 
government is willing to improve the efficiency of the management of SOEs and the 
efficiency of the securities markets, in the long-run, the IPO’s performance would be 




H 0 : There is no relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
government and government-owned companies and the three-year buy and hold 
market-adjusted returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
government and government-owned companies and the three-year buy and hold 
market-adjusted returns of IPOs. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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4.2 The Long-run Performance and Risk of the Companies 
Although both Levis (1993) and Khurshed (1999) suggested that bigger firms are 
better quality firms and are expected to have better long-term performance, since all 
the listed companies in China belong to the government, the size of the company does 
not really matter due to the government support. However, the offering size of the 
company can be treated as a proxy for risk. As the Chinese securities markets are not 
very closely regulated, one of the factors driving the share prices’ increase in the 
long-run could be insider trading and price manipulation by institutional investors. 
Institutional investors have a large amount of money in comparison with individual 
shareholders, and what they often do is to buy a high proportion of the outstanding 
shares of one company, controlling and increasing the price to earn abnormal returns. 
Although this kind of market manipulation is illegal, it exists in the Chinese markets. 
Since the smaller the offering size of a listed company has, the easier it is for 
institutional shareholders to control the price of the stocks; and the higher risk 
investors would face. Thus the higher long-run returns will be expected to be. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the offering size of IPOs and the three-year buy 
and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the offering size of IPOs and the three-
year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs. 
 
The second variable we defined is the high-tech dummy that measures whether the 
company has some high-tech products as defined by the Science and Technology 
Ministry. High technology is one of main factors that drive the development of a 
company. If a company produces high-tech products, it is supposed to enjoy high 
growth in the near future. However at the same time, companies with high-tech 
features will face more risk, which could be rewarded by its positive long-run 
performance. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient for high-tech dummy. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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Hypothesis 3: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the feature of belonging to a high-tech industry 
and the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the feature of belonging to a high-tech 
industry and the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs. 
 
4.3 The Long-run Performance and the Fundamental Factor of the Companies 
If the securities markets are efficient, the long-run performance of IPOs should reflect 
the business strength of listed companies (Khurshed, 1999). As Khurshed (1999), the 
proxies showing the quality of the company here are EPS
8, which shows the 
profitability of the company. The variable EPS measures the average earnings per 
share for the last three years before the firm’s listing. A firm which is profitable 
before flotation should continue to be so after IPOs. This is based on the empirical 
results on profit consistency found by Geroski and Jacquemin (1988), and Machin and 
Van Reenen (1993). These authors have found that profit in period t is normally 
highly correlated with profit in period t-1. This suggests that the more profitable a 
company is before its listing, the better its long-run performance will be. So we expect 
a positive coefficient for EPS.  
 
Hypothesis 4: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the average earnings per share for the last three 
years before the firm’s listing and the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns 
of IPOs.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the average earnings per share for the 
last three years before the firm’s listing and the three-year buy and hold market-
adjusted returns of IPOs. 
 
                                                         
8 As listed companies in China only started to offer cash flow statements after 1998 according to the 
regulation and our sample is the companies that went public in 1996 and 1997, here we choose 
earnings per share figures as the proxy for the fundamental factors. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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4.4 The Long-run Performance and the Further Capital-raising of Listed 
Companies 
Besides the improvement of the corporate governance of SOEs, the other purpose for 
the Chinese government to develop the securities market is to raise capital for SOEs. 
Therefore looking at the relationship between a company’s long-run performance and 
its further capital raising is useful to understand the role of the stock market. We have 
the following reasoning and understanding of their relationships. First, when a 
company enjoys efficient management and high growth, it would be reflected in an 
increase of its share price. At the same time, good management would bring more 
development opportunities to a company, so it needs further capital to invest. 
Therefore, the long-run performance of a listed company would be positively related 
to its further capital raising. Second in China, sometimes an increase in the share price 
results from manipulation by institutional investors rather because of efficient 
management, and the company does not have good projects in which to invest. For 
many companies, a stock issue is made simply in order to get money from the 
investors, rather than for investment in good projects or the implementation of 
corporate governance practices. In this case, when share prices rise, it is the ‘right’ 
time for companies to get more money from the stock market, since with higher prices, 
issuing the same number of shares can raise more money. The variable defined here is 
SEOtimes, which counts the number of SEOs
9 that a listed company makes within 
three years after its IPO. Following the reasoning of the both situations, the SEOtimes 
variable is expected to be positively related to the long-run performance of IPOs.  
 
Hypothesis 5: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the number of SEOs within three years after 
IPO and the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of SEOs within three years 
                                                         
9 Instead of looking at the sizes or prices of SEOs, we use the number of SEOs within the three years 
after IPO. According to the security regulation in China, the size of SEOs at each point in time cannot 
exceed 30% of outstanding shares. Since as long as the listed companies get the chance to carry out 
SEOs, they would like to raise as much capital as possible, the sizes of SEOs can be expected if the 
numbers of SEOs are known. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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after IPOs and the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs. 
 
4.5 The Long-run Performance and the Underpricing of IPOs 
As for the relationship between the initial returns of IPOs and their long-run price 
performance, the ‘impresario’ hypothesis argues that IPOs are underpriced by 
investment bankers (in our case, the government) to create the appearance of excess 
demand to make it an ‘event’. This hypothesis predicts that companies with the 
highest initial returns should have the lowest subsequent returns. Carter and Dark 
(1990) examined the correlation between initial returns and 18 month aftermarket 
returns and found that firms having higher initial returns tended to provide slightly 
lower long-run returns than firms having lower initial returns. Ritter (1991) found that 
firms that were more underpriced than others performed worse in the long-run.  
 
Hypothesis 6: 
H 0: There is no relationship between the market-adjusted initial returns and the 
three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs.  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the market-adjusted initial returns and 
the three-year buy and hold market-adjusted returns of IPOs. 
 
We also use a year dummy to test whether there is any difference between the long-
run performance of IPOs in 1996 and 1997. 
 
We use the market-adjusted buy and hold return over three years after IPOs 
(MABHR36) as the dependent variable in the regression analysis. The empirical 
model is estimated using OLS and is displayed as follows: 
MABHR36 i = a  +  1 b Govshare i  +  2 b  Log (Offersize)  i  +  3 b  Hightech 
                          Dummy i  +  4 b  EPS i +  5 b  SEOtimes i  +  6 b 1 i MAAR  
                          7 b Year2 i  + u i   
 
Table 4 gives a description of the variables used in the study. Table 5 reports the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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characteristic values of the variables in the study.  
 
5. Results for the Cross Sectional Analysis 
 
In the regression analysis, the sample consists of 340 companies out of the total 409 
that listed their A-shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1 
January 1996 to 31 December 1997. The reduced sample size is due to missing data 
on the estimated independent variables. Correlation coefficients are estimated as a 
preliminary examination of the pair-wise relationships among the variables in the 
study. The results of these estimations are provided in Table 6. The results of the 
regressions on the market-adjusted buy and hold return over three years after IPOs are 
presented in Table 7.  
 
Like Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), we find an extremely significantly negative 
relationship between the government ownership and the market-adjusted buy and hold 
returns over three years after IPOs and the null of hypothesis 1 can be rejected. With 
smaller fraction of shares owned by the government and government-owned 
companies, listed companies have less political risk and can improve the corporate 
governance by monitoring from outsider shareholders. Therefore, the companies can 
develop better after IPO and their share prices will increase. The negative impact of 
the government ownership on the long-run performance shows that privatization is 
good for the companies’ development, and can also encourage the government to 
reinforce economic reforms in China. 
 
Turning to the two variables related to the company’s risk, both are significant with 
the expected signs. Therefore we can reject the null of hypothesis 2 and 3. Unlike 
Levis (1993), our estimation results indicate a significantly negative coefficient on the 
offering size of IPOs. Chinese securities markets are not efficient. Price control and 
manipulation by institutional investors are rife. The smaller the offering size is, the 
easier it is for institutional investors to control the share prices of certain stocks and ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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the higher risk the investors face. Thus the higher long-run returns will be. This result 
indicates that the government should reinforce the regulation of the securities markets 
to improve market efficiency. The variable that measures the feature of a company 
belonging to a high-tech industry is significantly positive at the 1% level. When a 
company has certain high-tech products, investors would expect the company to enjoy 
high growth in the future. However, companies using high technology will face higher 
risk. When investors take higher risk, they would expect positive returns in the long-
run.  
 
As for the company’s business strength, the variable on the average earnings per share 
over the three years before the firm’s listing shows a positive relationship with the 
long-run performance, but it is statistically insignificant. Thus we cannot reject 
hypothesis 4. In an efficient market, the share price should reflect the business 
strength of a company, and with higher profitability, the company should have higher 
long-run returns (Khurshed, 1999). However the estimation results are against our 
expectation
10. The estimation result shows that in the Chinese securities markets, 
there are many other issues rather than a company’s business strength that affect the 
share price performance.  
 
In terms of the relationship between the long-term performance and further capital-
raising, results indicate that the number of SEOs within three years after IPOs and 
their long-run returns are significantly positively related to each other. Thus the null 
of hypothesis 5 can be rejected. For either the government or the issuers, the 
opportunities to raise money from the securities markets are very valuable. Any 
positive information about companies or their share price movements will be used as 
indicators that this is a good time to raise capital.  
 
The results for the relation between initial and long-run performance are similar to, 
                                                         
10 Our expectation is based on the assumption that the profit of a company in period t is normally 
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but not as strong as those of previous research. A cross-sectional study shows that 
they are negatively related to each other at the 10% significance level. The higher the 
return on the first trading day, the worse the performance in the long-run will be. 




This study attempts to satisfy the great interest in Chinese evidence on the 
performance, especially the long-run performance of IPOs. Our study not only 
confirms the high degree of underpricing of PIPOs in China (Mok and Hui, 1998, Gu, 
2000), but also finds a positive long-run performance, and offers some explanations 
for this economic phenomenon and the description of the characteristics of the 
Chinese IPO markets. 
 
We study the short-run and the long-run performance of IPOs using the sample of 340 
and 409 companies that listed A-shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges in 1996 and 1997. We find the average market-adjusted initial return is 
127.31% and the initial returns on both stock exchanges are not significantly different 
from each other. We raise the argument that the quota system for new issues in China 
is the main reason for the extraordinarily high degree of underpricing. The average 
market-adjusted buy and hold return over three years after IPO is 10.26%, which is 
significantly positive at the 1% level. Like many other studies of PIPOs (Menyah and 
Paudyal, 1996, and Megginson et al., 2000), we find long-run outperformance of 
Chinese PIPOs, which validates the view that the Chinese government is market-
oriented and wants to improve the economic prospects of the securities markets and to 
encourage their further development. Within the three years after IPO, it takes about 
three months for the share prices to adjust downwards to the market equilibrium due 
to the severe underpricing of IPOs. Then the return reaches its highest in the 6
th 
trading month after IPOs since employee stocks can begin trading at this time. This 
phenomenon shows the inefficiency and price manipulation of the Chinese securities 
markets. We also notice that most returns in the first two years are positive and are 
much higher than those in the third year.  
 
Using cross sectional analysis, we test the relationship between the market-adjusted 
buy and hold returns over three years after IPOs and some managerial factors on the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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sample of 340 IPOs that went public in 1996 and 1997. The results show that the 
government ownership and the offering size are significantly negatively related to the 
long-run returns of IPOs; the high-tech feature of the company is significantly 
positively related to the long-run performance; while the company’s profitability does 
not matter. Results also indicate that further capital-raising of a company is 
significantly positively related to its long-run performance, and that the higher initial 
return an IPO has, the worse long-run performance is followed, although the 
estimation is significant at the 10% level. 
 
This study answers the question that most investors are interested in—whether it is 
worth investing and holding IPOs in China. The answer is yes. And it is even better if 
investors can buy shares in the third month after listing and try to sell before the end 
of the second year. Among different companies, the ones with less government 
ownership, smaller offering sizes, high-tech features and lower initial returns are big 
winners. However, when share prices rise, investors have to be careful of the further 
issuing of shares by the companies, which will dilute their ownership.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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Table 1: IPOs in the Chinese Markets by the Year of Issuing 
 
  All IPOs 
(sample in study of 
long-run returns) 
























1996  203  103  100  155  77  78  76.355  74.757  78.000 
1997  206  85  121  185  79  106  89.806  92.941  87.603 
Total  409  188  221  340  156  184  83.130  82.979  83.258 
Mean  204.5  94  110.5  170  78  92       
S.D.  2.121  12.728  14.849  21.213  1.414  19.799       
 
Note: *SH stands for the Shanghai Stock Exchange; and SZ stands for the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. 
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Figure 1: A Diagrammatic Representation of the Distribution of IPOs on the 
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  Total Sample  Shanghai  Shenzhen 
Mean   127.31  122.49  131.40 
Standard Deviation  75.21  69.86  79.43 
t-statistics  31.21  21.90  22.44 
Median  118.34  114.25  121.07 
Minimum  -14.33  -14.33  -8.15 
Maximum  441.26  401.25  441.26 
Total Number of Issues  340  156  184 
t-statistic*    1.101 
 
 
Note: * Difference between the market-adjusted initial returns of IPOs on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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Table 3: The Average Monthly MABHR Returns for the 37 Months after Going 
Public 
 
Month of Seasoning  MABHR  S.D. of MABHR  t-stat 
2  -0.029  0.137  -4.250 
3  -0.009  0.124  -1.416 
4  0.005  0.123  0.775 
5  0.006  0.113  1.135 
6  0.019  0.122  3.111 
7  0.012  0.108  2.227 
8  0.000  0.107  0.023 
9  0.002  0.105  0.420 
10  0.007  0.106  1.297 
11  0.003  0.101  0.536 
12  0.016  0.109  2.969 
13  0.016  0.095  3.436 
14  0.007  0.095  1.457 
15  0.004  0.094  0.930 
16  0.008  0.095  1.683 
17  0.015  0.093  3.243 
18  0.007  0.082  1.745 
19  0.009  0.086  2.062 
20  0.016  0.093  3.405 
21  0.011  0.093  2.450 
22  0.003  0.102  0.664 
23  0.014  0.095  2.922 
24  -0.004  0.100  -0.816 
25  -0.006  0.096  -1.232 
26  -0.001  0.098  -0.151 
27  0.003  0.086  0.792 
28  0.000  0.096  -0.073 
29  -0.013  0.085  -3.182 
30  0.002  0.093  0.456 
31  0.005  0.113  0.821 
32  -0.009  0.097  -1.890 
33  -0.002  0.106  -0.303 
34  0.001  0.106  0.204 
35  -0.001  0.101  -0.227 
36  -0.011  0.090  -2.390 
37  -0.004  0.105  -0.707 
Total  0.103  0.524  3.962 
 
Note: *The first month of seasoning is not included in the study to ignore the initial 
underpricing.      ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
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Figure 5: Frequency of the Three-year Buy and Hold Market-adjusted Returns 
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Table 4: Description of the Variables Used in the Study of the Long-run 
Performance 
 
Year Dummies:  These are based on the 2 different years of the IPOs. (1996-1997) 
Year 2:  IPOs listed in 1997 
   
Proxies for the Government Ownership 
Govshare  Percentage of shares owned by the government and government-
owned companies on the issuing 
   
Proxies for Risk  
Offersize  The market capitalization of the listed company on the first day of 
trading, i.e. the offering shares multiply the offering prices  
High-tech dummy  The dummy to show whether a company has some high-tech products 
as defined by Science and Technology Ministry; 1-yes, 0-no 
   
Proxies for the Fundamental Factor of the Company 
EPS  The average earning per share of the issuer for the last three years 
before the firm’s listing 
   
Proxies for the Further Capital Raising 
SEOtimes  The number of SEOs the issuer has within the three years after IPOs 
   
Proxies for Underpricing Degree 
Underpricing  The market-adjusted initial return of the corresponding stock  
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Table 5: Characteristics of Sample Variables 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max  S.D. 
Three-year Buy and Hold 
Market-adjusted Returns 
0.0934  0.0956  -1.0772  2.4318  0.5109 
Govshare  0.7213  0.74  0.4161  0.8492  0.0788 
Offersize (Million Yuan)  235.12  163.87  12.60  2106.00  233.28 
EPS (Yuan)  0.4203  0.4001  0.1361  1.2098  0.1478 
Market-adjusted Initial Returns  1.2731  1.1834  -0.1433  4.4126  0.7521 
  Yes   No 
High-tech Dummy  57  283 
  Zero  Once  Twice  Three Times or More 
SEOtimes  102  216  22  0 
  1996  1997 
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Table 6: Correlation Coefficients of the Independent Variables in the Cross-
sectional Analysis of the Long-run Performance of IPOs 
 
 
   Govshare  Offersize  EPS  SEOtimes 
Offersize  -0.074       
EPS  0.027  0.217     
SEOtimes  -0.213  -0.014  0.064   
Underpricing  -0.075  -0.116  -0.228  -0.046 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-09 
Copyright Chi and Padgett, 2002  34




Dependent Variable: Three-year Buy and Hold Market-adjusted Returns 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 340 
 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Prob.  Hypothesis 
(expected sign) 
         
Intercept  2.456426  7.433302  0.0000   
Govshare  -1.295468  -4.402754  0.0000  1 (-) 
LOG(Offersize)  -0.321504  -7.615403  0.0000  2 (-) 
Hightech  0.327583  5.043079  0.0000  3 (+) 
EPS  0.188201  1.073856  0.2837     4 (+) 
SEOtimes  0.117988  2.674325  0.0079  5 (+) 
Underpricing  -0.066322  -1.802583  0.0724  6 (-) 
YEAR2 
 
0.184701  2.846061  0.0047   
R-squared  0.286820     
Adjusted R-squared  0.271783     
F-statistic  19.07436     






                                                         
11 The results for diagnostic tests are as follows:  
• White heteroskedasticity test: No heteroskedasticity; 
• Jarque-bera normality test: Not normal with skewness of 0.71 and kurtosis of 4.59; 
• Ramsey RESET Test: No nonlinear relationship between dependent and independent variables. 